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INTRODUCTION
Several recent Texas choice of law cases have misapplied the
most-significant-relationship test, the basic Texas choice of law test
adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.' The
misapplications (none from the Texas Supreme Court) predominantly
turn on the courts' improperly focusing on a single element of the
seven-factor most-significant-relationship test, 2 thereby thwarting its
function as a balancing test for competing interests. Texas courts are
not alone in this misunderstanding of choice of law tests. In recent
years most states have moved away from the old rigid choice of law
rules-easily applied, but often unfair-to the newer rules based on
balancing competing interests. In doing so, many courts have strug-
gled with these new multi-faceted tests.3
This outline offers a simplified but accurate structure for choice
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter "Restatement
(Second)"). This outline cites this source as the "Restatement (Second)" to underscore its
replacement of its predecessor, the Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), which many states
still follow. The occasional reference simply to the "Restatement" also refers to the Restatement
(Second). Texas adopted the most-significant-relationship test for torts only in Gutierrez v.
Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979), and later for all civil cases (except those with an
effective choice of law agreement by the parties) in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
2. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
3. See generally Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1585
(1985). In that article, Professor Hill illustrated the current misapplications of choice of law
tests, and argued that judges are intentionally fashioning ad hoc choice of law models and
rejecting the standard approaches such as the most-significant-relationship test. Professor Hill
argued persuasively, but Texas judges do not appear to be intentionally rejecting the most-
significant-relationship test. Rather, the trouble-prone Texas choice of law opinions appear to
be the result of hasty applications of the most-significant-relationship test, stemming from a
lack of familiarity with the Restatement (Second) and with United States Supreme Court
opinions on choice of law.
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of law analysis, from the constitutional issues in legislative jurisdic-
tion to the balancing factors of the most-significant-relationship test.
The result is a relatively simple outline of a complex subject. Al-
though the outline reduces choice of law to its simplest form, it may
seem unnecessarily complicated to some readers. Every point in the
outline however is a potential issue in any lawsuit with a foreign
element. Correctly applied, this outline will facilitate the choice of
law process by spotting choice of law issues, directing and narrowing
the choice of law analysis, and addressing both constitutional and
Texas standards for selecting the applicable law. Thus, in spite of
its initial complexity, this outline will enable Texas judges to make
most choice of law decisions quickly and accurately. Although the
outline is focused on the court's analysis-that is, it is formally
directed to judges, as are most choice of law articles-it will no
doubt provide insight for advocates.
This outline does not purport to be the exclusive approach to
choice of law. However, it does provide an efficient and thorough
analysis. Of course, this process cannot assure a reversal-proof choice
of law decision, but it can assure consideration of the important
choice of law issues, and thus make it more likely that the most
appropriate law is chosen. This outline can also simplify the choice
of law process by acquainting judges and practitioners with basic
presumptions favoring the application of forum (Texas) law in many
instances.
While this outline is thorough, it is only a checklist of issues
and not a comprehensive discussion. Readers should consult the cited
authorities as well as other references when problems arise.
DEFINITIONS
State means a territorial unit with a distinct general body of
law. It includes both states of the United States and foreign states.
In this article, other states in the United States are denoted by a
capitalized "States." Non-capitalized "states" refers generically to
all such territorial units, domestic and foreign.
Local law is the substantive law of the forum or another state.
The whole law of a state is its local law plus its choice of law rules.
The forum's choice of law rule-which is always controlling-will
usually point only to the local law of the chosen state. In a few
special cases the forum's choice of law rule will point to the "whole
1987]
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law" of the chosen state, meaning that the chosen state's choice of
law rule is applied.
4
Foreign law means any law other than Texas law or United
States federal law. Foreign law includes States' laws and other foreign
countries' laws.
I. TRIGGERING THE CHOICE OF LAW INQUIRY
Three distinct acts can trigger a choice of law inquiry. They are:
(1) a prior choice of law agreements by litigants;'
(2) a pleading for the application of foreign law; 6
(3) at the court's discretion, choice of law on the court's own motion
(sua sponte), without a choice of law request from the litigants, when
a significant foreign element appears in the law suit.7
A. Choice of Law Agreement by the Litigants
A contractual choice of law must be effective, applicable to the
lawsuit under the contract's terms, reasonably related to the lawsuit
(within legislative jurisdiction), and not in violation of relevant public
policy.
1. Effective Agreement
Have the litigants made an effective choice of law agreement?
Look for a prima facie agreement only. If there is any litigable
question as to the agreement's validity, it must be resolved by
applying the parties' chosen law unless that choice was made in order
4. The process of second-level choice of law is called renvoi. For some of the few renvoi
uses, see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. The Restatement (Second) section 4 defines
"local law" as it is used in this outline, but defines "law" as a state's local law plus its
conflict of laws rule (the same as "whole law" in this outline). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1971). However, Restatement (Second) section 8 provides that when
the forum state's choice of law rule directs the court to apply "the law" of another state,
that should ordinarily mean the local law only. Id. § 8. The Restatement (Second)'s reporters
should consider changing section 4 to use "whole law" to mean local law plus the conflict of
laws rule, and "the law" to mean local law only unless there is a reason for a reference to
renvoi (that is, to create a presumption against renvot). This would align section 4 with section
8. "Whole law" as used in this outline is taken from the Uniform Commercial Code, see
infra note 33, and from Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 592, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 492, 499 (1962).
5. See infra notes 8-24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:785
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to evade important forum policy as to contract validity,8 or unless
there is some other reason to deny the parties' choice. Note that
although most choice of law agreements are express, a clearly implied
choice of law should also be honored. 9
2. Applicable to the Lawsuit
Is the choice of law agreement applicable to this lawsuit? The
choice of law agreement's applicability may be based on the lawsuit's
being one of the following:' °
a. an action arising on the agreement in which the choice of law
clause appears;
b. an action contemplated by the agreement in which the choice
of law clause appears.
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 and comments (1971);
E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 637-40 (1982) [hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]; R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 355-63 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
WEINTRAUB].
9. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137-41, 1 S. Ct. 102, 111-16, 27 L. Ed.
104, 108-10 (1882); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 8, at 632-34 & n.7; WEINTRAUB, supra note 8,
at 354-55. Earlier conflict of laws practice presumed that the parties contracted with reference
to the law of the place of the contract's making (lex contractus), and issues of contractual
validity were therefore determined by lex contractus unless a contrary intent was apparent in
the contract. See, e.g., Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Harris, 94 Tex. 25, 35, 57 S.W. 635, 638
(1900). This presumption as to the contracting parties' subjective intent appears to have been
replaced by the objective rule that the law of the place of the contracting governs validity
(with no intent imputed) unless the parties express or imply otherwise. The difference is mostly
academic, but it is significant that we no longer impute intent to the parties. Intent now
matters only where it is expressly or impliedly present. This move away from imputed intent
allows the court to escape the rigid application of lex contractus, as illustrated in the
Restatement (Second) sections 189-207 which call for the application of a certain situs' law
(for example, section 196 calls for the law of the place of performance for service contracts),
unless some other state has a more significant relationship to a particular issue. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAWS §§ 189-207 (1971). If the old practice survived and a lex
contractus intent was imputed to the parties, we could not displace lex contractus without
violating the rule that the parties' intent has priority even where another state has a more
significant relationship. The result would be an inflexible application of lex contractus or, if
the court wished to evade lex contractus, an over-reliance on forum public policy. We avoid
these harsh results and awkward escape devices by dropping the practice of imputing a choice
of lex contractus to the parties. However, as noted above, this abandonment of imputed intent
is speculative. It is evident in the Restatement (Second)'s rules and comments, and in the
descriptions of state practice from conflicts' treatises, although those sources do not expressly
describe the decline of imputed intent. In the courts, however, it is not clear that the old
practice of imputing a lex contractus intent has been abandoned. The only evidence is the
infrequent or total lack of reference to the old practice.
10. See Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. 1968)
(contract's effect determined by the law which the parties' intended to have control).
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If neither of the above apply and if no other valid basis exists for
applying the parties' choice of law agreement, then the court should
disregard the agreement and apply forum law or, if requested by a
litigant, a more appropriate foreign law."
3. Reasonably Related to the Lawsuit (Legislative Jurisdiction)
Is the constitutional requirement of a minimal connection be-
tween a legal dispute and the law applied to it satisfied? Legislative
jurisdiction governs all choice of law problems, including those of
contractually chosen law.' 2 This minimal connection is similar to the
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) ("Law Governing
in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties").
12. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-20, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2978-
79, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 646-48 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and
comment d (1971). The minimal connection requirement arises from the due process and full
faith and credit clauses of the United States Constitution. Due process protection, U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV, focuses on the litigants, forbidding the forum to apply an unrelated state's
law to their dispute. Full faith and credit, id. art. IV, § 1, protects other states' interests by
not allowing the forum to apply an unrelated (in some cases, less related) state's law in place
of the law of a state with a significant interest in the case. Two important factors determining
a state's interest in having its law applied are (1) the state's contacts with the dispute, and (2)
the pertinence of the state's laws and policies to the subject matter of the dispute. Readers
should note that due process protects all litigants, while full faith and credit protects only
those litigants whose claims arose under the laws of another State of the United States. For
general background on legislative jurisdiction, see ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 8, at 79-104;
WEINTEAUB, supra note 8, at 511-34; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587
(1978) [hereinafter "Reese"].
A continuing controversy is whether parties should be allowed to choose a law that lacks
legislative jurisdiction, that is, a law unconnected to them or their contract. Although case
law requires a connection between the contract and the parties' chosen law, see ScoLEs &
HAy, supra note 8, at 644 n.1, critics view the minimal connection requirement as an
unnecessary interference in private contracts. See id. at 644. Texas courts have required that
the parties' chosen law have a reasonable relationship to their contract. Teas v. Kimball, 257
F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1958); Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp.,
474 S.W.2d 261, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas
Business & Commerce Code section 1.105(a) requires a reasonable relationship for UCC
contractual choice of law. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1987). Similarly, the Restatement (Second) requires a reasonable relationship between a
contract and the contractually selected law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
187 (1971). In certain cases, such as usury, more than a reasonable relationship may be
required between the contract and the governing law. See id. § 203 (1971); Pedersen & Cox,
Choice of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law and the National Bank Act, 34 Sw. L.J.
755, 764-67 (1980) [hereinafter "Pedersen & Cox"].
The United States Constitution also limits choice of law through its equal protection and
privileges and immunities clauses. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; see SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 8, at 104-10; WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 543-47.
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minimum contacts requirement for judicial jurisdiction over nonres-
ident defendants. 3 Unfortunately there is very little guidance as to
what constitutes a minimal connection in legislative jurisdiction.
4
If the parties' chosen law appears to lack a minimal connection
to them or their dispute, they should be advised of the problem and
requested to make arguments on the existence of a minimal connec-
tion that justifies their chosen law's application. If either party
establishes to the court's satisfaction that the chosen law has legis-
lative jurisdiction, that law should be applied. If the court is not
persuaded, or if the parties fail to provide arguments on legislative
jurisdiction, the court should either:
a. apply forum (Texas) law, if there is legislative jurisdiction, or
b. if Texas lacks legislative jurisdiction but has judicial jurisdic-
tion (which is unlikely but not impossible), the court may raise
choice of law sua sponte.15 Another option is for the court to
exercise the presumption that by failing to prove the contents of
any foreign law, the parties have acquiesced to application of
forum law.'
6
c. If Texas lacks legislative jurisdiction and the court fails to find
13. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDoUoAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 164 (4th ed.
1986) [hereinafter "LEFLAR"]; J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 338-42 (2d ed. 1984); SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 8, at 82 n.7; Reese, supra note 12, at 1589-92. Note that while the minimal
connection requirement for legislative jurisdiction resembles the minimum contacts required
for judicial jurisdiction, the legal finding of one will not establish the other.
14. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 814-23, 105 S. Ct. at 2977-81, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 643-49
(denying Kansas' legislative jurisdiction for lack of a sufficient connection); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-14, 101 S. Ct. 633, 637-41, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521, 527-31 (upholding
Minnesota's legislative jurisdiction, finding a sufficient connection in the aggregation of
Minnesota's contacts even though the contacts were individually insufficient); see also REs-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 comment d (1971) (discussing the basic criteria
for determining choice of law). In addition, Restatement (Second) section 188 lists factors
influencing choice of law in contract actions. These factors should influence legislative juris-
diction as well (i.e., if the given law satisfies the choice of law factors, those factors should
relate to, though not conclusively establish, legislative jurisdiction). Id. § 188. Similar connecting
factors for tort cases are listed at Restatement (Second) section 145. Id. § 145. In addition to
minimal connection factors, legislative jurisdiction may depend on legislative intent in cases
involving statutory law. Legislative intent, or the lack of it, illustrates the state's regulatory
interest in the parties' dispute. If the state has no regulatory interest, or did not intend a
statute's application to foreign lawsuits or to the subject matter in the parties' contract, then
arguably the statute should not be applied.
15. This option is discussed at Part IC in the outline. See infra notes 25-29 and accompany-
ing text.
16. This option is discussed at Part IIIB in the outline. See infra notes 45-49 and accompany-
ing text.
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the contents of another suitable law, the court should either apply
forum (Texas) law, under the presumption that unproven foreign
law is the same as forum law, or dismiss the case.1 7 This situation
will not happen often, but is possible where a plaintiff sues for
tortious injury occurring in a foreign country where the laws are
not widely published.
Legislative jurisdiction can be complex and difficult. Fortunately, the
problem does not arise often. If the forum has judicial jurisdiction,
the same underlying contacts between the forum and the defendant
will usually create legislative jurisdiction in the forum. Thus forum
law is a reliable standby if the parties' requested foreign law lacks
legislative jurisdiction.
The court need not address legislative jurisdiction in every choice
of law opinion. It requires analysis only when raised by the parties,
or by the court in obvious cases.' 8 However, while the court's written
choice of law opinion may overlook legislative jurisdiction, the court's
actual examination of a choice of law problem should not.
4. Public Policy
If the parties' choice of law agreement is valid and applicable
to this action, and their chosen law has legislative jurisdiction, it
should be applied unless its application would violate the forum's
17. See Humphrey v. Bullock, 666 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
18. It is unclear whether courts must raise challenges to legislative jurisdiction sua sponte
where the parties have failed to object at trial. The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that courts may not apply a law that has no connection to the dispute, see supra note 14, but
it is not clear whether the Supreme Court would so rule where a choice of law objection was
not made at trial. If a court is required to challenge legislative jurisdiction sua sponte without
a litigant's timely objection, then legislative jurisdiction would join subject matter jurisdiction
as a non-waivable issue. But legislative jurisdiction has less resemblance to subject matter
jurisdiction than it does to judicial jurisdiction, which is waived if not asserted at the outset
of litigation. The distinction is clear from FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(h)(3): "Whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action." Id. (emphasis added).
The author's guess is that the court is not required to raise legislative jurisdiction sua sponte,
although it has the discretion to do so. If this guess is correct, litigants wishing to challenge
legislative jurisdiction will have to do so in the trial's pleading stage. See infra notes 25-29
and accompanying text (discussing the court's sua sponte role in choice of law questions).
Note that legislative jurisdiction differs from choice of law. The former asks if a given law
has the constitutionally minimal connections to the dispute. The latter asks which, of all the
laws with legislative jurisdiction, is the most appropriate to resolve the dispute.
[Vol. 18:785
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public policy. 19 Public policy concerns must be fundamental and
strongly held; mere variance between the foreign law and Texas law
is not enough to deny the foreign law's application. 2° The federal
constitution's full faith and credit clause2' encourages application of
other States' laws where no forum policy is infringed upon. 22 Thus,
all but the strongest forum policies must give way to the full faith
and credit mandate. Note that section 187 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) provides that the pertinent public policy interests include not
only the forum's but also those of any other state whose law would
be applied in the absence of the parties' choice of law. 23 Of course,
in many cases forum public policy may also deny the application of
the law otherwise selected by the forum's choice of law rule.
24
B. Pleading by One or More Litigants
If any litigant makes a timely request for the application of
foreign law, the court should conduct a choice of law analysis as
described in Part II of this outline.
C. Sua Sponte Choice of Law
If the lawsuit contains a foreign element suggesting that non-
forum law may be appropriate but the parties have not raised a
choice of law issue, the court may consider choice of law on its own
motion .25
1. If the forum state has legislative jurisdiction and the parties
have failed to request the application of any foreign law, the
court may apply forum law under the presumptions listed in
19. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979); Castilleja v. Camero, 414
S.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Tex. 1967); Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468, 475 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ dism'd).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971); SCOLES
& HAY, supra note 8, at 637-43; Pedersen & Cox, supra note 12, at 777-79.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
22. Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 322-23, 101 S. Ct. at 645, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 536-37
(Stevens, J., concurring); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 8, at 87-94.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). But section 187 was
not adopted in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984); it may or
may not be applicable in Texas courts. Though perhaps inapplicable, section 187 is compatible
with Texas law.
24. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 18.
19871
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Part IIIA of this outline.26 However, the court is not required
to follow the presumptions favoring forum law; it may instead
conduct a full choice of law analysis to determine the most
appropriate law .27
2. If the forum state lacks legislative jurisdiction and the parties
have failed to request the application of foreign law, then the
parties should be advised of the inappropriateness of forum law
and requested to provide arguments on the identity and content
of applicable foreign law(s). If the parties provide arguments and
evidence for the application of only one foreign law that has
legislative jurisdiction, then it should be applied. If the parties
argue for more than one foreign law with legislative jurisdiction,
then a choice of law analysis should be conducted as described in
Part II of this outline. If the parties fail to provide any sufficient
choice of law arguments, then:
a. apply forum (Texas) law under the presumption that it is the
same as the unproven foreign law, or that the parties have
acquiesced to forum law; 28 or
b. dismiss the case if the pertinent Texas law (hypothetically
lacking legislative jurisdiction) is unsuited or unintended for the
presumptions stated above; or
c. consider choice of law sua sponte by determining which states
have a minimal relationship to the action, then choosing the most
appropriate state's law as will be explained in Part II. These three
options are discretionary. 29 Generally option (a) is preferable be-
cause it resolves the dispute instead of dismissing it, and does so
under the substantive law the court presumably prefers.
26. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
27. The full analysis is described in Part II of this outline. See infra notes 30-42 and
accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
29. In cases where Texas lacks legislative jurisdiction and the parties have failed to suggest
applicable foreign law(s), the options of applying Texas law, dismissal, or sua sponte choice
of law are within the court's discretion because the court must do one of the three, and Texas
law is silent as to which is proper. New York courts have held that sua sponte choice of law
is mandated under N.Y. Crv. PR.Ac. L. & R. 4511 (McK. 1963), which requires the court to
take judicial notice of foreign law "without request." See Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Sheerin, 65 A.D.2d 10, -, 410 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (App. Div. 1978). The dissent in
Government Employees argued that N.Y. Crv. PRic. L. & R. 4511 was not self-executing and
that it required judicial notice without request only where the parties had suggested the
application of a foreign law, but had failed to ask the court to recognize the contents of that
law. 65 A.D.2d at -, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). But the majority held that N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 4511 requires a sua sponte
choice of law analysis anytime the pleadings indicate the possible application of another law,
whether the parties have raised the issue or not. See 65 A.D.2d at -, 410 N.Y.S.2d at
642-44. At present, the only time a Texas court arguably must engage in sua sponte choice of
law (or dismiss the case) is when the parties have pleaded under Texas substantive law but
Texas lacks legislative jurisdiction. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. As explained in
[Vol. 18:785
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II. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
A. Identify the Choice of Law Problem
Note whether it relates to an entire claim or just one issue in the
claim, as directed by the Texas Supreme Court in Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co.3" See the characterization and depecage discussions at
Part IV of this outline.
B. Identify the Potentially Applicable Laws for the Claim or Issue,
as Requested by the Litigants
If the choice of law analysis is made on the court's own motion,
identify the potentially applicable laws apparent in the pleadings. In-
clude forum law as a potential choice, whether the litigants request
it or not and whether it is suggested by the pleadings or not (although
forum law may be eliminated at the legislative jurisdiction stage).
C. Eliminate All Choices from Part IIB that
Lack Legislative Jurisdiction"
If only one law remains, apply it to the case. If more than one
law remains, conduct a choice of law analysis giving preference to forum
law.
D. Determine the Appropriate Choice of Law Rule
Consider only the forum's choice of law rules (unless directed by
a forum choice of law rule to apply another state's choice of law rule).32
note 15, supra, it is likely that the court is not required to raise the issue if the parties fail
to, but it is within the court's discretion. If the court decides to raise choice of law sua sponte,
it should request the parties to submit arguments as to which laws apply and to submit copies
of those laws as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184. See supra text accompanying
note 28. It may be apparent from the pleadings that the dispute is connected to a specific
state, but the court should nonetheless request the parties' arguments as to which law controls
in order to elicit choices that may not be apparent in the pleadings. In particular, some issues
may be controlled by the law of a state that is not obvious in the pleadings. See depecage
discussion, infra note 62 and accompanying text.
30. In Duncan, the Texas Supreme Court stated that "in all choice of law cases, except
those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law
of the state with the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be
applied to resolve that issue." 665 S.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added). See Faloona v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1295 (1987) for a good example of setting up the choice of law
analysis by focusing on the particular substantive issues.
31. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
32. Some readers will disagree that only the forum's choice of law rules apply, recalling
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1. Apply a statutory choice of law rule if the forum has one.
Statutory choice of law rules are directed to specific substantive
law, such as negotiable instruments, wrongful death, and so on.
They are usually found in the particular substantive statute. As
legislative law, they have priority over the Texas Supreme Court's
most-significant-relationship test.33 In addition to these statutory
the renvoi doctrine. Renvoi is the conflict of laws practice calling for the application of choice
of law rules of other states. But renvoi is appropriate only when authorized by forum law.
Thus the forum's choice of law rule is still in control. Renvoi is also practiced in cases under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), where the controlling substantive
law is "the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred." Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 592, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (1962). But here again renvoi
is practiced only because it is designated by forum (federal) law. For further renvoi discussion,
see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8 (1971).
33. The Restatement (Second) provides that "[a] court, subject to constitutional restric-
tions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971). The most-significant-relationship test from the
Restatement (Second) section 6(2) applies only where there is no specific statutory directive.
Id. § 6(2). Specific statutory choice of law rules in Texas include:
(1) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987),
honoring the parties' choice of law in a UCC-governed contract, subject to the
exceptions in § 1.105(b).
(2) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987),
stating that the parties' choice of law in § 1.105(a) does not override the contrary
provisions in sections 2.402, 4.102, 6.102, 8.106, and 9.103, which are also choice
of law statutes. Section 1.105(b) also provides that the law indicated by those
subsequent UCC choice of law rules will include the "whole law" of the referent
state, including its choice of law rule (i.e., § 1.105(b) calls for renvoi).
(3) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), applying, at
the creditor's option, the [whole] law of the state where the goods are situated to
certain issues involving creditors' rights against sold goods.
(4) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.509 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), applying the
law (substantive law only) of the place of dishonor to the payee's protest of a commer-
cial paper's dishonor.
(5) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), applying the
[whole] law of the place where the bank is located to issues involving bank liability
for action or non-action regarding presentment, payment or collection.
(6) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), applying the
forum's [whole] law to cases involving bulk transfers of goods located in Texas.
(7) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987), applying
the whole law of "the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer" in cases involving
the validity, effectiveness of registration, and issuer's rights and duties regarding
investment securities.
(8) TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987), applying
the [whole] law of various designated jurisdictions in cases involving the perfection
of security interests in multi-state transactions.
The "whole" law in the above UCC sections means the substantive law plus the choice of
law rule of that state (i.e., renvoi). Where "whole" is bracketed, it is unexpressed in that
section but imposed by § 1.105(b). In § 8.106, where "whole" is not bracketed, it is express
in the statute.
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choice of law rules, Texas courts should give priority to several
(9) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE AN. § 33.09 (Vernon Supp. 1987), providing that the
rights and duties of a corporation and its transfer agents in registering a security or
in making a transfer of a security pursuant to a fiduciary's assignment are governed
by the law of the jurisdiction under whose laws the corporation is organized, and
providing further that for the purposes of this Act, a National Banking Association
is deemed to have been organized in the state in which its principal banking house
is located.
(10) TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066 (Vernon 1986), providing that a
Texas action on a foreign judgment is barred if the action would be barred under
the laws of the rendering jurisdiction.
(11) TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.067 (Vernon 1986), providing that a
person may not bring a claim against a person who has moved to Texas if the claim
is barred by the statute of limitations of the state or country from which the person
came.
These last two statutes are examples of "borrowing statutes," that is, Texas limitations statutes
that borrow the limitations rule of another state. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 8 at 360-67.
(12) TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.003, 71.031 (Vernon 1986), providing
for choice of law in wrongful death actions involving acts or deaths outside of
Texas.
(13) TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981), providing that Texas law governs
certain local insurance contracts notwithstanding the contract's designation of exe-
cution or performance in another state.
(14) TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.43(e) (Vernon Supp. 1987), providing that a
foreign casualty insurer does not have to make the deposit required by Texas law if
it had made a similar deposit in any other State, under that State's law, and in a
manner that secures equally all policyholders who are citizens and residents of the
United States.
(15) TEX FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 14.71, 21.21 (Vernon 1986), providing for choice
of law in enforcement of foreign child support decrees.
(16) TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 9.03 (Vernon 1964), providing that
any contract made by any foreign savings and loan association with any Texas citizen
shall be deemed a Texas contract and construed under Texas law.
(17) TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2370c-3, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987), providing
for the applicable law in various situations in the joint two-state operation of justice
centers in border counties, and providing in particular that if it is impossible for a
person to conform his or her conduct in the justice center to the laws of both states,
that person may choose which state's law governs that conduct.
(18) TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1987), providing for
choice of law in workers compensation actions for injuries outside of Texas.
Federal law also has specific choice of law statutes, including:
(19) 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), providing for choice of law and renvoi in claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court imposed renvoi by statutory
construction in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 592, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 492, 499 (1962).
(20) 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1982), providing for choice of law in injury claims under the
federal Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Act.
To the extent these Texas statutory choice of law rules are inadequate in certain cases (other
than the federal claims), they should be supplemented with Texas' general choice of law rule,
the most-significant-relationship test. This list of statutes was principally prepared by Chris Kouros,
a 1986 graduate of Southern Methodist University Law School, as a term research project in
the Conflict of Laws course.
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specific choice of law rules found in the Restatement (Second).34
These rules, designed to be used with the most-significant-rela-
tionship test, are arguably controlling in Texas under Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.," and if not controlling, are at least persu-
asive.
2. If the forum has no statutory choice of law rule, apply Texas'
general choice of law rule: the most-significant-relationship test.
3 6
It comprises seven factors, set out in section 6 of the Restatement
(Second):
(a) the needs of the interstate and international system;
(b) the relevant policies of the forum;
3 7
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
34. Specific choice of law rules for torts are set out at Restatement (Second) sections 145-
55 for various tort claims, and sections 156-85 for various tort issues. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-85 (1971). Specific rules for contract claims are found at sections
186-97, and for contract issues, at sections 198-221. Specific property rules are stated at
sections 222-66; trusts at sections 267-82; status at sections 283-90; agency and partnership at
sections 291-95; business corporations at sections 296-313; and estate administration at sections 314-
423. Id. §§ 198-423.
35. 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
36. See id.
37. One function of this factor is to deny the application of an otherwise controlling
foreign law that violates a strongly-held public policy of the forum state. Just as the parties'
contractual choice of law may be denied for violating forum policy, see supra notes 19-24 and
accompanying text, so may forum policy deny the application of the law selected by the
forum's choice of law rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971);
SCOLES & RAY, supra note 8, at 72-75; WEINTRrAuB, supra note 8 at 481-85. But as with the
parties' contractual choice of law, the displacing public policy must be strongly held and not
mere legislative preference.
Note the distinction here between the forum's dismissing the lawsuit, and its retaining the
lawsuit and applying forum law. The court may retain the lawsuit and apply its law if (1)
forum law has a sufficient connection to the dispute (i.e., there is legislative jurisdiction), and
(2) no other State has a special connection to the dispute that compels the application of its
law. If forum law lacks a sufficient connection to the dispute, then the court has the choice
between applying the obnoxious law or dismissing the lawsuit. See New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77, 38 S. Ct. 337, 340-41, 62 L. Ed. 772, 783 (1918); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214, 42 S. Ct. 467, 468, 66 L. Ed. 900, 907 (1922); Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408-09, 50 S. Ct. 338, 341-42, 74 L. Ed. 926, 933-34 (1930).
Similarly, if there is a special connection between a sister State's law and the dispute, the full
faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, may compel the application of the obnoxious
sister State's law. Again, the court has the choice of applying the obnoxious law or dismissing
the lawsuit. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820-23, 105 S. Ct. 2965,
2980-81, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 648-49 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-08,
101 S. Ct. 633, 637-38, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521, 527-28 (1981).
Public policy exclusion of other states' laws is not this factor's only function. It also interacts
with section 6(c) to balance the interests of the forum state with competing interests of other
affected states. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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interests of those states ...;38
(d) the protection of justified expectations;
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result;
(g) ease in the determination and application of law. 39
If any of the Restatement (Second)'s specific rules are applicable, use
them with the seven factors of the most-signficant-relationship test.
These factors are not exclusive and may be supplemented as
justice requires. 40 Moreover, the factors are not listed in order of
importance, but will have varying significance in different cases. In
all but the simplest cases the factors will point in different directions,
that is, to different choices of law. These factors are meant to reflect
competing interests, and some choices may be difficult.41 But if the
court considers all factors in these difficult cases, and gives them the
weight it deems appropriate, a fair result will likely occur.
Only the hardest cases should involve all seven factors. In most
cases, where some of the seven factors are insignificant, the court's
opinion need not acknowledge the insignificant factors. On the other
hand, the court should not short-circuit the most-significant-relation-
ship test by picking only one of the seven factors, as some Texas
courts have done recently. 42 Although one factor may stand out in
a choice of law problem, the court should not allow that one factor's
prominence to undermine a fair consideration of the other factors
which may, when fully considered, reveal interests competing with
the interests in the prominent factor. Basing a choice of law decision
on one factor alone is, at best, narrow reasoning and, at worst, a
manipulation of the choice of law process.
38. Although another state may have a strong policy relating to the lawsuit (such as a
strict usury law), that state's interest in the particular lawsuit itself may be minor compared
to the interests of other states and of the forum, thus making the strong usury policy of the
first state less important in this dispute. For additional discussion, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, comment f (1971).
39. Id. § 6. Texas adopted section 6 in Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
40. The Restatement (Second) specifically describes the listed factors as "include[d]"
among those relevant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
41. See id. comment c.
42. See, e.g., Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 709 S.W.2d 724, 730 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]) (seemingly applying the relative interests of the states and ease in determining
applicable law while ignoring the other considerations), rev'd on other grounds, 719 S.W.2d
161 (Tex. 1986).
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E. Choose the Applicable Law by Applying the Appropriate
Texas Choice of Law Rule
The following process should indicate which choice of law rule
is appropriate in a given situation: (1) Use specific choice of law
rules, if any, first. If the specific rule is inadequate or incomplete for the
problem at hand, supplement it with the most-significant-relationship
test. (2) If no specific rule exists, use the most-significant-relationship
test. (3) In the choice of law analysis, apply the presumptions to be
discussed in Part III where appropriate.
III. PRESUMPTIONS AND PREFERENCES IN CHOICE OF LAW
A. Preference for Forum Law
Forum law should be applied in Texas courts unless another law
is shown to be more appropriate by the parties' agreement or a Texas
choice of law rule. Forum law is favored by presumption in two
situations. First, the parties may request application of a foreign law
but fail to prove its contents. It may then be presumed that either
Texas law is the same as the unproven foreign law or that the parties
have acquiesced in the application of Texas forum law by failing to
meet the burden of proving their requested foreign law. 43 Second,
43. In Texas, this presumption applies both to foreign country law and to the law of
other States and territories in the United States. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184 governs
the determination of laws of other States, territories and jurisdictions in the United States.
TEx. R. Crv. P. 184. It imposes a burden of proof on the moving litigant to provide (but not
prove) the contents of the desired law. Rule 184 states, in pertinent part, that the requesting
party "shall furnish the judge with sufficient information to enable him properly to comply
with the request" to apply another state's law. Id. Before rule 184a was adopted in 1943, the
absolute burden was on the moving party to prove the contents of the desired foreign law by
furnishing copies of that law and by offering supporting testimony or other proof. The 1943
addition to the rules required the court to take judicial notice of the requested law. But this
change is evidentiary only. The movant still has the duty to furnish copies of the law, but
now may request that the court take judicial notice of these copies. (The judicial notice
requirement did not shift the burden to the court to find copies of the desired foreign law.)
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184a governs the determination of foreign country law. Its
main difference from rule 184 is the absence of judicial notice. The movant not only must
provide the contents of the foreign country law, but must also offer supporting testimony.
TEX. R. Cirv. P. 184a. For the purposes of this outline, the distinction between rules 184 and
184a is an irrelevant evidentiary matter. The only relevant point is that the moving litigant
must furnish copies of both foreign country law and the law of other States and territories in
800
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there may be no stronger reason to favor a foreign law over the
forum law. All other things being equal, forum law applies. That is,
where forum law has a relationship to the dispute as significant as
other potentially applicable law, forum law is applied. This rule does
the United States. Failure to do so should result in the application of Texas law under the
presumption that Texas law is the same as the unproven foreign law, or that the parties have
acquiesced in the application of Texas law. See Humphrey v. Bullock, 666 S.W.2d 586, 589
(Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (foreign law presumed to be the same as Texas
law). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 comment h (1971)
(forum will apply its law when the parties have failed to prove foreign law). The risky
presumption that forum law is the same as foreign law is safest where the applicable foreign
law is the common law of another State in the United States. The presumption is also
frequently applied to statutes of another State in the United States and sometimes to foreign
legal systems based on common law. In unusual cases, the presumption has been extended to
non-western law under the presumption that all legal systems share certain fundamental legal
principles. This presumption allowed a California court to presume that California community
property law was the same as unproven Chinese law, Louknitsky v. Louknitsky, 123 Cal.
App. 2d 406, -, 266 P.2d 910, 911 (1954), allowed the equating of Turkish and Oklahoma
law, Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962), and the equating of Hungarian
law and Ohio law, Mastics v. Kiraly, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 266, -, 196 N.E.2d 172, 179-80 (P.
Ct. 1964). A Texas court applied the presumption to assume that Mexico had a divorce
residency requirement identical to that of Texas. See Webb v. Webb, 461 S.W.2d 204, 205
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, no writ). On the other hand, most courts would reject
these unlikely analogies of dissimilar laws. Many courts have refused to equate their own law
with civil law systems. Cases are set forth in Annotation, Presumption as to Law of Foreign
Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529, 530-41 (1961), and Annotation, Pleading and Proof of Foreign
Law, 75 A.L.R.3d 177, 185-219 (1977). Of course, where the court declines the presumption
of similarity with forum law, it may still use the presumption that the parties have acquiesced
in forum law by failing to prove the contents of foreign law.
An interesting 1985 Texas case rebuked the presumption of similarity between Texas and
California law. McFadden v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330, 331-32 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ), dealt with the Texas enforcement of a California default
judgment. Judgment debtor McFadden had also defaulted in Texas and execution had issued.
Id. at 331. At the execution stage, McFadden appeared and defended on the grounds that the
California court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the orignal debt. Id. The California
court was a municipal court which in Texas would lack subject matter jurisdiction over debt
collections. See id. at 332. Plaintiff bank failed to present California law providing subject
matter jurisdiction in the initial judgment to the Texas court. Id. McFadden argued that the
Texas court must presume the unproven California law to be the same as Texas law regarding
the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal courts. The Texas court refused, noting the stronger
presumption under full faith and credit that the judgments of other States are valid until
proven otherwise. Id. The court also noted that only California law could disprove a California
court's subject matter jurisdiction, and since McFadden failed to rebut the presumption of
validity, she lost. Id. For a general discussion of Texas rule 184, see McConnico & Bishop,
Practicing Law with the 1984 Rules: Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Effective
April 1, 1984, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 73, 103 (1984). For a discussion of Texas Rule 184a, see
Bishop, International Litigation in Texas: Texas Rules of Evidence and Recent Changes in the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 131, 145-47 (1984).
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not apply where the parties have made a valid pre-lawsuit choice of
law agreement. 4 In those cases, the choice of law analysis is never
reached, so it is never determined which state's laws are equally or
more significant for the lawsuit.
B. Situs Presumptions
The Restatement (Second)'s specific subject matter choice of law
rules45 presume the applicability of certain foreign laws related to the
situs of the event giving rise to the cause of action. For example,
Restatement (Second) section 146 states that in an action for personal
injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties unless some other state has a
more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.
46
These presumptions reflect many of the old mechanical choice of
law rules-lex locus delicti, lex locus contractus, and so on-that
were the basis of common law choice of law and the first Restatement
of Conflict of Laws.47 In the Restatement (Second) these situs pre-
sumptions retain the ease of application of the old mechanical rules
without their sometimes harsh, inflexible results. 8 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) accomplishes this by providing that a certain state's law will apply
unless another state has a more significant relationship under the factors
set out in section 6 of the Restatement (Second).
49
C. Preference for the Parties' Chosen Law in Contractual
Lawsuits
Restatement (Second) sections 187 through 197 governing choice
of law in particular contracts, give the parties' contractually chosen
44. See supra notes 8-24 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971).
47. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 8, at 12-16.
48. The harsh results were caused by the old conflicts' rules' inflexibility. In personal
injury cases, for example, the rule that the applicable law was that of the site of the injury
was generally fair, and prevented forum shopping. But it was an absolute rule that allowed
no exceptions. See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 96 S. Ct. 167,
46 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1975). Zimmerman involved a personal injury action against a Texas
manufacturer of an artillery round that prematurely exploded in Cambodia. Id. at 3, 96 S.
Ct. at 167, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 4. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court required the Texas
federal court to apply the Texas choice of law rule, which was the inflexible lex locus delicti-
the law of the place of the wrong. Id. at 4-5, 96 S. Ct. at 168, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 5. That was
Cambodian law, which had no system of products liability law. Id. at 3, 96 S. Ct. at 167, 46
L. Ed. 2d at 5.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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law priority over (1) forum law, (2) the presumptive choices noted
in Part III B, and (3) any other choice of law determined by the
forum state's statutory or general choice of law rules.51 This prefer-
ence for the parties' chosen law in contract actions is also reflected
in Texas statutes, 5' and in the seminal choice of law holding in
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
5 2
The parties' choice is merely a presumptive preference, however.
It can be displaced if the choice lacks legislative jurisdiction," if the
results are contrary to strongly-held forum state policy,5 4 or if the
results are contrary to a strongly-held policy of the state whose law
would be applied if not for the parties' choice of law. 5
IV. OTHER FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Characterization
Characterization is the process of labeling, defining, or catego-
rizing the facts and legal concepts in a lawsuit. It exists in all lawsuits,
but has two special functions in choice of law situations. First,
characterizing a claim as, for example, a tort rather than a contract
may change the forum's choice of law.5 6 Similarly, characterizing an
issue as procedural rather than substantive may bring that issue under
forum law instead of a foreign substantive law."
Characterization's second special function for choice of law is
just that-choice of law. Which law controls the characterization of
a lawsuit's facts and issues? The Restatement (Second) provides that
forum law controls the characterization of "the form of the action"
50. Id. §§ 187-97.
51. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). But see
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 9.03 (Vernon 1964). See supra note 33 for a synopses
of both statutes.
52. 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
53. This is discussed in Part I A 3 of this outline. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying
text.
54. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
56. Texas has, of course, adopted the most-significant-relationship test for all civil cases
except those where there is an effective choice of law agreement by the parties. Duncan, 665
S.W.2d at 421. Applying that test may, nevertheless, result in different results depending on
how the claim is characterized.
57. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 comments & illustrations (1971)
(discussing "characterization" and the range of the term's use).
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(law versus equity, contract versus tort, and so on) and the conflict
of laws issues.58 Forum law also controls several traditionally pro-
cedural issues, especially those regarding the conduct of the litiga-
tion .9
All other issues, concepts, and legal terms are characterized by
the law governing that issue (that is, the law chosen by the forum
state's choice of law rule).60 The Restatement (Second) prefers this
flexible approach to characterization, and avoids rigid labels that
would determine choice of law without considering the particular
issue's function in the lawsuit. This approach allows foreign law
to play a determining role to insure that foreign-based claims are
58. Section 124 discusses form of action. See id. § 124. Section 7(2) prescribes forum law
for conflict of laws issues, including which of the forum's choice of law rules to apply, which
facts control the choice of law process, whether to use renvoi and whether to use depecage.
See id. § 7(2) (1971).
59. Id. § 122 (1971) (creating a presumption favoring forum law for "rules prescribing
how litigation shall be conducted"). The Restatement (Second) also designates several tradi-
tionally procedural issues that are to be governed by forum law. See, e.g., id. §§ 126, 136,
137 (service of process and notice and proof of foreign law witness competence).
60. Id. § 7(3). In its "Procedure" sections (sections 122-44), the Restatement (Second)
designates several traditionally procedural issues that should be characterized and governed by
the law chosen by the forum state's choice of law process for that issue. See, e.g., id. §§ 140-
41 ( arol evidence and statute of frauds). Some issues lean toward control by forum law, but
have exceptions calling for a foreign law. See, e.g., id. § 135 (sufficiency of evidence controlled
by forum law, with exceptions stated in sections 133-34). Readers should note that when the
Restatement (Second) directs the application of the law chosen by the forum state's choice of
law process for these issues, that does not necessarily mean the substantive law governing the
major substantive issues in the case. Rather, it means the appropriate law for that issue.
Statutes of limitation are a particularly troublesome area for substance/procedure charac-
terization. The Restatement (Second) section 142 (1986 Revisions, April 15, 1986) replaces the
former Restatement (Second) sections 142-43, addressing statutes of limitation. The new section
142 states that "[an action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations
of the forum unless the action would be barred in some other state which, with respect to the
issue of limitations, has a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence." Id.
§ 142 (1986 Revisions). The reporter's note following the new section 142 reprints the pertinent
text of the new UNIFORM CONFLICT OF LAws-LIMITATIONs ACT, 12 U.L.A. 50-53 (Supp. 1986),
which has now been adopted by Arkansas, Colorado, North Dakota, and Washington. The
Uniform Limitations Act differs from the Restatement (Second)'s position in that the Uniform
Act presumes the applicability of the foreign statute of limitations any time a foreign claim is
brought to the forum, except where its application would result in unfairness to the plaintiff.
The Restatement (Second) does not automatically assume that a foreign claim will carry the
foreign statute of limitations with it. If Texas adopts the Uniform Limitations Act, however,
it will not contradict Texas' adherence to the Restatement (Second). The Uniform Limitations
Act would become a borrowing statute, which the Restatement (Second) gives priority to over
its own rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1), § 142 comment b
(1986 Revisions).
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not cut short on their substantive content by the forum's contrary
characterizations. However, the Restatement (Second)'s flexible char-
acterization can be difficult in some cases. If the court finds it too
difficult to characterize a particular issue under foreign law, it should
use forum law for practicality.
6'
Characterization is the first step in any choice of law analysis,
indeed in any lawsuit. Thus characterization could have been the
first step in this outline; it is not because in most cases characteriza-
tion is effortless. Difficult cases, however, may require some work to
characterize key issues within the choice of law process.
B. Depecage
Depecage is the practice of splitting multiple claims in a lawsuit,
or multiple issues in a claim, and applying different states' laws to
the separate issues or claims. Depecage is controlled by forum law,
and is largely within the court's discretion. 62
C. Renvoi
In certain cases, forum law may direct the application of the
"whole law" of the chosen state, that is, the other state's local
(substantive) law plus its choice of law rule. This practice of second-
tier choice of law is called renvoi, and is appropriate in certain
limited cases where the forum wants the same legal result that would
61. Two examples of problems with the Restatement (Second)'s characterization approach
are: (1) Choice of law for contract cases sometimes turns on whether the dispute relates to
the contract's validity or its performance. If the issue is validity, the law of the place of the
contract's making is preferred (though not mandated). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 199 (1971). If the issue is performance, the law of the place of performance
is preferred. See, e.g., id. §§ 202(2), 206. The Restatement (Second) section 7 provides that
the most appropriate substantive law ought to govern the characterization of validity and
performance separately. Id. § 7. But how can the appropriate substantive law be applied to
characterize the dispute as being validity or performance, when the appropriate substantive
law cannot be selected until the characterization is completed? It seems that only forum law
will allow the case to proceed at this point. The same circularity problem exists in some
instances of substance/procedure characterization. (2) A second characterization problem is
that once the court has chosen the appropriate law for characterizing an issue, that law may
be vague or incomplete for characterizing the particular issue. Even if the foreign law has
sufficient information for characterizing the issue, that information may be difficult for the
court to find. As with the first problem, forum law is the practical alternative.
62. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 72-79.
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be reached by the courts of the chosen state. Sometimes renvoi is in-
tended by the forum's statutory instruction to apply "the law" of the
other state, instead of the clearer term "whole law." ' 63 In these ambiguous
cases, the court must decide if the intent is to reach the same result
as the other state's court would reach, or merely to apply the
substantive law of the other state.
Texas requires renvoi in some portions of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code. 4 The Restatement (Second) suggests renvoi in
certain cases involving real property, personal property, succession
of decedents' interests in movables, and trusts. 65 The Restatement
(Second) also notes the practice of renvoi in certain domicile issues.
66
The Restatement (Second)'s renvoi sections are at least persuasive,
but may not be controlling in Texas unless they are officially em-
braced by the Texas Supreme Court, which has thus far only adopted
the Restatement's most-significant-relationship test and not the entire
Restatement. 67 Federal law uses renvoi to select the applicable law
for claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
68
Courts should presume against renvoi. It should be used only when
forum law expressly indicates, or when the forum's choice of law rule
seeks the same results that a court in the chosen state would reach
by applying its own choice of law rule.
D. False Conflicts
A false conflict occurs when the laws of two or more states are
the same, or produce the same result. If there are identical laws in
all states being considered, then there is no choice of law problem.
The one law is applied. If there are identical laws in two or more
states, but not all the states being considered, the states with identical
laws should be treated as one state, adding their choice of law
63. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 6.102(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
64. See supra note 32.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223-26, 228, 230-42 (real property),
§§ 245, 248-49, 253, 255 (personal property), §§ 260-63, 264(2), 265 (decedents' movables), §§
269, 274-75, 277-82 (trusts) (1971).
66. Id. § 13 comment c.
67. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982); see supra note 31.
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contacts and interests.6 9 Remember that Texas choice of law is done
on an issue-by-issue basis. Thus there may be false conflicts in some
issues and real conflicts in other issues in the same case. In fact,
this mix will appear in most choice of law cases.
V. FEDERAL COURTS
The fundamental choice of law problem in federal courts is
whether state or federal law will govern a particular issue in a case.
The Erie doctrine attempts to resolve this.70 This outline does not
discuss Erie problems in depth because Erie analysis differs from
traditional territorial choice of law, with quite distinct analytical
elements. Because Erie problems are distinct, they are excluded from
the Restatement (Second)'s choice of law rules. 71 While this outline
does not provide an Erie analysis, the following generalizations apply
to federal court choice of law where the Erie problems are already
resolved. These generalizations are directed only to substantive law,
as is this entire outline.7 2
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment i, § 186 comment
c (1971). For a comprehensive discussion of false conflicts, including other meanings, see
LEFLAR, supra note 13, at 270-73; see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 8, at 603-04. For the
United States Supreme Court's view of false conflicts, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 814-23, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2977-81, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 643-49 (1985). Note
particularly Justice Stevens' dissent. 472 U.S. at 823-29, 105 S. Ct. at 2981-84, 86 L. Ed. 2d
at 650-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For discussion of false conflicts in the Supreme Court, see
WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 517 (discussing Allstate), 527-29 (discussing Phillips Petroleum);
see also Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law? 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 17, 18-24 (1981) (further discussing Allstate).
70. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). The
source for Erie-type problems is the Rules of Decision Act, adopted in 1789. 28 U.S.C. 1652
(1982). Although seldom cited, it is the primary federal choice of law rule, providing that
"[tihe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id. From this
premise, the Erie doctrine now controls the conflict of federal and state law in federal courts.
304 U.S. at 71, 58 S. Ct. at 818-19, 82 L. Ed. at 1190. There are several other significant
cases in the development of the Erie doctrine. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct.
1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct.
893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89
L. Ed. 2079 (1945).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 comment c (1971).
72. Traditional choice of law inquiry focuses on substantive law, assuming that forum
law will govern procedure. (But see Part IVA of this outline for the role of procedural issues
in choice of law.) This traditional practice is followed in courts of general jurisdiction in the
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A. Diversity Cases
Substantive issues in diversity cases are usually governed by State
or foreign country law, and not federal law. The applicable State or
foreign country law is determined in Texas federal courts by the
appropriate Texas choice of law rule. 73 The one exception is for
diversity cases transferred to Texas from a federal court in another
state under 28 U.S.C. 1404; 74 in these cases the first State's choice
of law rule is used.
75
B. Federal Claims
Substantive issues in federal claims (based on the Constitution,
federal statutes, federal common law, or public international law)
are usually governed by the appropriate federal law, or by the law
chosen by any available federal choice of law rule. 76 Some substantive
issues in these cases may be governed by State law because of an
Erie ruling and not because of a territorial choice of law rule.
CONCLUSION
This outline does not attempt to cover everything there is to
know about choice of law in Texas courts. But its author is unaware
of any reported Texas choice of law decision for which this outline
is insufficient. It will spot the majority of choice of law issues that
can arise when a foreign element appears in a case. While the outline
spots many issues, it does not resolve them all. In particular, legis-
lative jurisdiction can be a thorny problem and is not fully addressed
in this outline. Fortunately, problems the outline does not resolve
United States, but not in federal courts. There, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
all appropriate issues. Federal procedural issues not covered by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are subject to Erie analysis. The issue is then determined by the law selected by the
Erie process. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 4501-15 (1982) (hereinafter "WRIGrr, MILLER & COOPER"].
73. This is the Klaxon doctrine. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.
Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
75. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n.8, 102 S. Ct. 252, 259 n.8, 70
L. Ed. 2d 419, 428 n.8 (1981).
76. See supra note 33, subheadings (18) & (19) for two examples of specific federal choice
of law rules; see also 19 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 72, at §§ 4501, 4513-15
(discussion of federal choice of law problems in non-Klaxon cases).
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do not occur often, although the issue of legislative jurisdiction
occurs at least passively in every case.
This outline does provide a formula approach to a difficult,
multi-tiered problem that courts and lawyers have often hoped to
avoid for lack of a systematic approach. Within this outline's formula
approach are answers to many potential issues.
Most of the points in this outline are accepted legal solutions.
Some, however, are mere suggestions for problems having no specific
answers. One example is the suggestion for the court's sua sponte
actions in Part IC. This area is virtually without rules; there are
neither mandates nor proscriptions for the court's self-initiated choice
of law.
Another speculative area is the extent to which the entire Res-
tatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is controlling in Texas choice
of law problems. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. adopted only the
most-significant-relationship test from the Restatement (Second), and
not the Restatement (Second) as a whole. 77 Texas courts have cited
other portions of the Restatement (Second), 7 but it is unclear whether
these are controlling or merely persuasive. The Texas Supreme Court
should clarify the extent of the Restatement (Second)'s applicability
in Texas.
The most convenient clarification would be the adoption of the
entire Restatement (Second). Adopting the Restatement (Second) in
its entirety would not interfere with Texas' ability to modify the
Restatement's rules; the Texas legislature may enact a specific choice
of law rule for any issue it desires. The Restatement (Second) gives
such specific statutory choice of law rules priority over its own
rules. 79 Adopting the entire Restatement (Second) would not under-
mine Texas' substantive law by promoting foreign law. The Restate-
ment (Second) tends to protect the forum's substantive law by strong
deference to forum public policy and state interest. In any event,
77. 665 S.W.2d at 421.
78. E.g., First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 228 comment c, 229 comment e, 254 comment e (1972)); Perry v.
Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971)); Wickware v. Session, 538 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 287(2) (1971)).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
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whether the court wishes to adopt the entire Restatement (Second)
or not, its role should be clarified by the Texas Supreme Court.
To the extent the suggested resolutions for speculative problems
are valid, they offer the same advantage as the many verified solutions
stated in this outline-a clear direction for judges and litigants when
a foreign element creates an issue of legislative jurisdiction or choice
of law.
APPENDIX
The following three examples illustrate the outline's operation.
The examples focus on some of the more common choice of law
problems.
Example One: Contractual Choice of Law; False Conflictss0
Dr. William McLean developed and patented a device for space
satellites, to which the United States government had a nonexclusive,
royalty-free license because of McLean's federal employment. Mc-
Lean mistakenly believed that the United States' license was exclusive.
In 1975, Hughes Aircraft Company became interested in McLean's
device and told McLean that the federal government's license did
not prevent his making an agreement with Hughes Aircraft. Hughes
and McLean made a licensing agreement that year in which McLean
was to receive certain royalties and Hughes would obtain a reissuance
of the patent and pay the costs of any resulting infringement lawsuits.
In 1980, having received minimal royalties on his license agree-
ment with Hughes, McLean proposed that Hughes Aircraft buy his
patent. Hughes agreed and the sale occurred. After McLean died in
1983, his attorneys and heirs reviewed McLean's two contracts with
Hughes (the 1975 license and the 1980 sale). McLean's heirs decided
that Hughes had intentionally misrepresented the potential royalties
to McLean. They sued Hughes Aircraft in 1985 for rescission of the
two contracts based on fraudulent inducement; they added a second
claim for damages for breach.
McLean was a Texas resident, had developed the patented device
in Texas, and had negotiated the two Hughes contracts while in
Texas. Hughes Aircraft was a Nevada-based company and had used
80. This example is based on Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d
867 (1984).
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McLean's device at their Nevada location. McLean's heirs argued
that Texas law should control both the contract and the tort claims
because Texas had the most significant relationship to the claims.
Hughes argued that Nevada law should control both claims: the tort
claim because Nevada had the most significant relationship (as the
site of the alleged fraudulent conduct), and the contract claim because
of a clause in both contracts stating that "it is the intention of the
parties that this Agreement shall be construed, interpreted, and
applied in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada."
Which State's law should control each claim?
Analysis
The breach of contract claim
This choice of law problem involves a contractual choice of law
agreement by the litigants. To test the agreement's validity, the
criteria in Part IA of the outline is applied.
Have the parties made an effective choice of law agreement?
(1) Prima Facie Agreement: There appears to be a prima facie agreement
because the contracts were written (not essential, but helpful, as
proof), the choice of law clauses are express and clear, and the
contracts were in force for several years. (These are not exclusive
elements, but are surely sufficient in this case for prima facie validity.)
(2) Applicable to Lawsuit: This is an action arising on the contracts,
so the choice of law clauses do apply to this lawsuit. (3) Reasonably
Related to the Lawsuit: There is a sufficient connection between
Nevada and the parties' contracts in that Hughes Aircraft is a
Nevada-based company that contracted with McLean to use his device
in Nevada. (4) Public Policy: There is nothing apparent on the face
of the proffered Nevada law, nor have McLean's heirs offered any
evidence of any Texas public policy conflict with Nevada law on
these issues. Thus Texas public policy will not block the application
of Nevada law to this breach of contract claim.
Because this four-part test is satisfied, the parties' choice of law
agreement should be honored by applying Nevada law to the breach
of contract claim, as mandated by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.8
and the Restatement (Second) section 187.82
Note that the parties' choice of law agreement is honored even
though the contracts' validity is questioned in the accompanying
81. 665 S.W.2d at 421.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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fraud claim. If a contract has initially apparent validity, its ultimate
validity should be litigated under the law chosen by the parties unless
that choice violates the four-part test.
If there had been no choice of law agreement in the contract
(and if none were implied), or if the parties' choice of law had been
disallowed by the four-part test, then the court would have to conduct
a regular choice of law analysis as described in Part II of the outline.
The fraud claim
This tort choice of law problem would ordinarily require a
complete analysis under the most-significant-relationship test dis-
cussed in Part II of the outline. However, in the case on which this
problem is based, the court noted that there was no material differ-
ence between the two competing laws.83 Thus, the conflict was false
and no choice of law analysis was necessary. The court did not reveal
which State's law it then applied, but the custom is to apply forum
law (if forum law is one of the choices). That is, the court would
then look to the forum's statutes and case law rather than the other
State's law because forum law is more readily available to the court.
Example Two: Specific Statutory Choice of Law Rule
In 1983 the plaintiff received a money judgment against the
defendant in California, which was enforceable for two years under
California law. The plaintiff was unable to find assets to execute the
judgment on in California; but in 1986, three years after the Cali-
fornia judgment, the plaintiff found such assets in Texas. The
plaintiff filed an action in a Texas state district court based on the
California judgment.
The defendant responded that the prior judgment had expired
in California and that California law was controlling on this point
in the Texas action. Plaintiff argued that judgment limitations are
procedural and are thus governed by forum (Texas) law. In Texas,
judgments are enforceable for ten years.
Analysis
This choice of law problem is created by the litigants' pleadings,
as noted in Part IB, which leads immediately to Part II of the
outline. The following analysis is suggested:
83. 57 Md. App. at __, 469 A.2d at 888. In the actual case, the choice was between
the law of Maryland, the forum, and of California. Id. at __, 469 A.2d at 887.
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Identify the choice of law problem: The choice of law issue is
the enforceability under Texas law of a California judgment that has
expired under California law.
Identify the potential choices: California law or Texas law.
Eliminate those laws lacking legislative jurisdiction: Both Cali-
fornia and Texas have a sufficient connection to this action-Cali-
fornia as the forum for the original judgment and Texas as the
current forum addressing an arguably procedural issue.
Determine the appropriate choice of law rule: Consider only
forum choice of law rules (unless directed by a forum choice of law
rule to apply another state's choice of law rule). Is there a specific
Texas statutory choice of law rule? Yes. Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 16.06684 directs that California law control
Texas' action on this California judgment. California bars enforce-
ment of this judgment and so must Texas. The case should be
dismissed.85
Example Three: The Most-Significant-Relationship Test
This is a defamation lawsuit in Texas over an allegedly defam-
atory statement made in Nebraska by the head football coach at
Nebraska State University. His statement that "in Texas, football
coaches carry checkbooks in their sweatpants" was picked up by the
Associated Press and carried in several newspapers, including major
Texas newspapers. Nine Texas coaches jointly filed a defamation
action in a federal district court in Texas against the Nebraska State
84. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.066 (Vernon 1986).
85. The plaintiff had an alternative to filing a new court action in Texas. He could have
filed an administrative request under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
[hereinafter "UEFJA"]. TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-35.008 (Vernon 1986).
The UEFJA provides an administrative procedure for filing an authenticated judgment from
any State in the United States (or from any court entitled to full faith and credit). Id. §
35.003. The Texas court then authorizes local execution, to which only Texas law applies. Id.
Interestingly, if the plaintiff had filed the three-year-old California judgment under the UEFJA
in Texas, Texas choice of law rule section 16.066 would not apply because it governs only
actions on foreign judgments. But the result under the UEFJA would probably be the same
as in our example. The reason is that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 31.006
requires that all Texas judgments over one year old be novated by scire facias or an action
of debt. Id. § 31.006 (Vernon 1986). With scire facias, the California debtor could probably
raise an equitable issue of the invalidity of the judgment in California. With an action of
debt, the California debtor could raise section 16.066, the Texas choice of law statute applied
in Example Two. Nonetheless, it seems an oversight that an invalid foreign judgment might
be enforced administratively in Texas when it could not be enforced in a legal action.
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University coach, asking for actual damages of $100,000 each, and
punitive damages of $100,000 each.
The defendant coach's Answer argued that Nebraska law should
govern the action because the allegedly defamatory statement was
made there. Nebraska does not allow punitive damages. Accordingly,
the Texas plaintiffs responded that Texas law should control because
Texas had the most significant relationship to the issue of damages,
all of which were suffered in Texas where the plaintiff-coaches lived
and worked.
Analysis
This choice of law problem is expressly raised in the parties'
pleadings, which, according to Part IB, leads us directly to Part II,
the choice of law analysis.
Identify the choice of law problem: This choice of law problem
relates only to the issue of punitive damages, not to the entire claim.
Because there is no other known variance between Texas and Ne-
braska law in this case, no other issue or claim requires a choice of
law analysis. Once it is decided which law governs punitive damages,
the law of the forum (Texas) should be applied to the remaining issues.
Identify the potentially applicable laws: Nebraska or Texas.
Eliminate those laws lacking legislative jurisdiction: Nebraska
has a sufficient connection to the lawsuit as the State where the
allegedly defamatory statement was made and also as the defendant's
domicile. (Being the defendant's domicile may itself be insufficient,
but it cumulatively strengthens the first factor.) Texas has a sufficient
connection to the lawsuit because it is the plaintiffs' domicile and
the site of publication of the statement.
Determine the appropriate choice of law rule: Is there a specific
statutory choice of law rule? No; therefore, an application of the
general choice of law rule is necessary. Texas uses the most-signifi-
cant-relationship test adopted from the Restatement (Second).86 How-
ever, before applying the most-significant-relationship test, it should
be noted that the Restatement (Second) has other specific rules for
this problem. Section 145 (the general tort principle) invokes the
most-significant-relationship test, and adds the following factors to
supplement the test: the place where the injury occurred; the place
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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where the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, resi-
dence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of
the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.1
7
Section 150 (multi-state defamation) invokes the most-significant-
relationship test, and adds that "[w]hen a natural person claims that
he has been defamed by an aggregate communication, the state of
the most significant relationship will usually be the state where the
(plaintiff) was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of
was published in that state.""8
Section 171 (tort damages) provides that the law selected under
section 145 determines the measure of damages.8 9 Comment d to
section 171 specifies that exemplary (or punitive) damages are gov-
erned by the law selected under section 145.9
These Restatement (Second) rules are not necessarily controlling
in Texas but have been followed in recent Texas defamation and
invasion of privacy cases. 91 If used, they must be considered in light
of the most-significant-relationship test of section 6. The rule most
on point is section 171 (tort damages), but it merely refers to section
145. Another highly pertinent rule is section 150 (multi-state defa-
mation), which creates a presumption that the law of plaintiffs'
domicile should be applied. Turning to a somewhat less specific rule,
section 145 (general tort rules) offers four points to consider in
conjunction with the section 6 analysis: (1) the place where the injury
occurred was Texas; (2) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred was Nebraska; (3) the parties were domiciled in Texas
and Nebraska, although many more parties were in Texas than
Nebraska; and (4) the place where the parties' relationship was centered
is irrelevant here. 92 Although it is true that the plaintiffs had certain
common associations with the defendant (for example, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association), those commonalities were not the basis
of this lawsuit.
87. Id. § 145.
88. Id. § 150.
89. Id. § 171.
90. Id. § 171 comment d.
91. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985); Ritzmann v. Weekly World News, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1336,
1338 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (N.D.
Tex. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1295 (1987).
92. This section is often appropriate and relevant in cases involving the breach of duty
of care, such as the care owed by a driver to a guest or paying passenger.
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These section 145 factors are to be weighed according to their
relative importance in this case. One indication of importance is
section 150's emphasis on the plaintiffs' domicile. Thus, section 145
favors Texas both in the quality of factors (plaintiffs' domicile) and
in the number of factors. Although the section 145 factors favor Texas,
this conclusion should be considered in light of the factors in section 6.
Section 6 has seven factors, known as the most-significant-
relationship test:93
a. The needs of the interstate and international systems. The
international system is probably disinterested (and uninterested) in
the availability of punitive damages in an American defamation
lawsuit between football coaches. But the interstate system has a
large interest because of the importance of multi-state communica-
tions and of the constitutional rights of free press and free speech,
and because of the plaintiffs' due process rights to litigate their
complaint under the appropriate State's law. This factor has no clear
resolution in this case. The interstate-system factor favors neither
Nebraska nor Texas law. It is neutral.
b. The relevant policies of the forum include compensating
resident tort victims and punishing intentional tortfeasors (the latter
policy being evident in the availability of punitive damages for this
action in Texas). The factor is important in this case, and obviously
favors Texas, but must be weighed against the following factor.
c. The relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states. Nebraska's policies in limiting tort damages
to actual losses are presumably to prevent the plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment, and to protect the defendant's arguable due process right
to avoid penal damages in a civil action. Although these policies may
be strong in Nebraska, they must be weighed according to Nebraska's
relative interest in this case. Nebraska's interest is that its resident-
the defendant football coach-may lose more money if punitive
damages are allowed.
How does this compare to Texas' interest? If punitive damages
are not allowed (assuming that defendant is found liable), the defend-
ant will not be penalized as intended by Texas law. Subsequent
defamers may feel free to cause such injuries in Texas. Nebraska's
interest has seemingly less importance, even though the tortious
93. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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conduct occurred in Nebraska. Moreover, because Texas is the forum
and its determination is binding, equivalent factors may be determined
in its own favor. Of course, if the Texas court favors forum interests
over another state that has clearly superior interests, the court risks
violatng Texas law and the United States Constitution.9" But in this
case, the court can favor Texas' interests over Nebraska's because
Nebraska's interests are at best equal to (and probably less than) those
of Texas.
d. The protection of justified expectations. The plaintiffs and
the defendant probably had no expectations regarding punitive dam-
ages in this matter. 95 This factor is irrelevant.
e. The basic policies underlying the particular field of law. There
are no clear-cut "basic policies" underlying punitive damages in
defamation cases because of the variations from state to state.9 This
factor is irrelevant.
f. Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result. The current
trend is to apply the law of the plaintiffs' domicile at the time of
the defamation.97 Applying this rule may not cause uniformity of
substantive results (because the applicable law will vary in each case
with the plaintiffs' domiciles), but it will promote uniformity as to
choice of law analysis. This factor favors Texas.
g. Ease in determination and application of the law. This factor
is unimportant because the only issue in this case is the availability
of punitive damages. This factor would be important if non-forum
law were unfamiliar or difficult to apply.
The application of the most-significant-relationship test confirms
the earlier indications for Texas law under sections 145 and 150. In
section 6, parts b, c and f favor Texas; the other parts are neutral
94. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. There is no apparent constitutional
problem with determining that Texas' law applies, particularly in light of Restatement (Second)
section 150 which favors the plaintiff's domicile. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 150 (1971). Note that the forum priority applied to competing states' interests is
probably inappropriate for the needs of the interstate system. The reason is that while the
forum can, within limits, favor its own policies over those of other interested states, it cannot
as easily resolve interstate impasses (those within the United States federal system) in its own
favor. The needs of the interstate system are national concerns. Those national concerns may
yield to forum policy in some cases, but not as quickly as another State's purely local interests.
95. This factor is more appropriate where the defendant bases his conduct on a standard
set by law, or where the plaintiff is exposed to risk while relying on a legal standard.
96. There is a current challenge to punitive damages in many States, but no clear policy
has emerged.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 149-50 and comments (1971).
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or irrelevant in this case. None of the factors clearly favors Nebraska,
although its interests are reflected in factors a and c. This is a balancing
test. The interests of Nebraska and the defendant coach are weighed in
this analysis, even though they do not prevail. Some cases will be more
difficult to weigh, but when the court has considered all pertinent factors
of this balancing test, its choice of law is more likely to be appropriate.
Note that in an actual case many of the conclusions reached
here could be disposed of in a sentence or less, with several factors
being resolved in a paragraph. The neutral and irrelevant factors
might be omitted from the court's written opinion, although their
inclusion would assure a reviewing court or critic that all factors
were considered.
One example of an adequate choice of law analysis is Moorhead
v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. , an aviation wrongful death
action. If Example Three were reduced to its essentials-as it should
be in the court's written order-and if the non-issues were omitted,
the result would resemble Moorhead's efficient analysis. The finished
product will usually be concise. The analysis leading to that finished
product, however, should involve, at a minimum, a consideration of
the pertinent issues in this outline.
98. 639 F. Supp. 385, 390-91 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
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